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THE ABROGATION OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATE
CONTRACTS.
By Louis Cox*
'When operating costs began to soar to extraordinary levels
following the economic disturbances caused by the World War,
practically all of the public service corporations in the United
States applied to the various state regulatory comnmssions for
an increase in rates, notwithstanding the fact that they were
operating under franchises, municipal ordinances or other con-
tracts which limited the amount of their charges. The rate-
payers contended that a contract was a contract, and that if
corporations engaged in the ordinary lines of business had to
live up to their obligations, there was no reason why a public
utility company should not live up to its covenants. Thus, the
ratepayers wanted the rule established that such contracts were
inviolable and could not be abrogated or altered, the public
service corporations maintained that such contracts did not
stand in the way of a rate increase. The state commissions, in
the discharge of their duty to fix reasonable rates, generally
found it necessary to grant applications for temporary rate in-
creases, and, therefore, of necessity, to disregard these rate con-
tracts.
-It is interesting to note how, and at whose instance, the
rule was first enunciated that the state, by reason of the police
power, had the right to vary contract rates. Curiously, the rule
was established at the behest and insistance of the representa-
tives of the public and originally was as vigorously opposed by
the public utility companies as it has, in recent years, been
espoused by them. The rule was established in cases prior to
the "hngh price" era and prosecuted upon the demand of the
consumers that the particular contract in controversy was
exorbitant and should be reduced in protection of the inalienable
rights and general welfare of the citizens. It will -be remem-
bered that in the agitation in favor of a decrease of transporta-
tion rates during the period from 1870 to 1890, one of the
* Louis Cox, member of Kentucky State Bar Assn., Chambers,
Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Frankfort, Kentucky.
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fundamental principles of the Granger organization was that
-all public service corporations are subject to legislative control,
and that such legislative control should be in express abroga-
tion of the theory Df the inalienable nature of charter rights.
Many of the early railroad charters gave the corporations the
authority to regulate rates, and the Granger organization m-
sisted that these charter contracts did not preclude proper rate
regulation by the state. It was, without doubt, just as hard
for the corporations in the early days to understand why they
were not protected by their rate contracts, from interference
by the state as it was for the ratepayers at a later date to appre-
ciate why such agreements were not inviolable.
Since the War many cases have been before the courts and
the state regulatory coinnssions in which applications have been
made for an increase in rates beyond the amounts fixed in
franchises or contracts, and no doubt these cases now outnum-
ber those in which applications were made on behalf of the pub-
lie for a reduction of charges below the contract amount. Where
these cases are taken together they show fairly conclusively
that the fixing of rates -by contract is a very unsatisfactory
method of regulation, for the reason that conditions which can-
not be forseen at the time of the agreement may so change over
a period of years as to render the contract unfair either to the
public utility or to the consumer. In recent years the con-
tracts which have been the subject of the greatest controversy
are those in which rates were fixed in franchise contracts or
municipal ordinances, which, upon acceptance by the utility
company, became binding agreements between the municipality
and the public service corporation. By the great weight of
authority it has been held, for one reason or another, that
state commissions may prescribe fair and reasonable rates with-
out regard for such franchises or ordinances.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the various ques-
tions that have arisen relative to the abrogation of rate con-
tracts by state regulatory bodies, and particularly what would
be the situation if a utility comnnission was established in tins
Commonwealth. The various principles of law underlying a
proper solution of these questions are complex in the extreme,
elaborately technical and difficult to approach. They have,
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however, drawn the concentrated and cooperative attention of
some of the foremznost attorneys in the Country
It has been held uniformly and universally that the power to
supervise and regulate rates of public service corporations is a
governmental function, and occupies a large place within the
police powers of the state.1 This principle of law is now so
thoroughly settled that it needs no further discussion.
It may be stated as axiomatic that where no power is shown
for the execution of an inviolate rate contract, the state has
power, hru its public service commission or otherwise, to alter
the rates fixed by contract in whatever form, franchise
or otherwise, such contract has been entered into.2  While it
may appear unjust for a corporation or an individual
to obtain the valuable right from a municipality to use its
streets and alleys to establish its lines and conduits therein, and
further that rates are agreed upon, and such solemn agreement
is written into the franchise, then, after the corporation has
established its plant and operated under the franchise agree-
ment for sometime, that it be allowed to repudiate its agree-
ment. However, the courts have justified the abrogation of
such agreements upon the theory that the municipality is but
an arm ofi the state, and as public utilities are performing a
public service, the state, in the exercise of its sovereign power,
has the right to regulate the rates and charges therefor, and
all of the late decisions, with regard to the question of rates
to be charged by public service corporations, support the rule
that the state, or its utilities commission, has the authority to
fMunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; 97nythe v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466,
42 L. Ed. 819; Knozville Water v. Knoxville, 189 U. S. 434, 47 L. Ed.
887; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Com., 248 U. S. 372, 63
L. Ed. 309; Anercan Thread Co. v. Mil Water Co. (Me.), 146 AtI.
645, Billings v. Pub. Serv. Cor. (Mont.), 214 Pac. 608; Hillsboro v.
Pub. Serv. Com. (Ore.), 187 Pac. 617; Lust v. Metropolitan, Etc., R. Co.,
222 Ill. App. 288; Sandpoint Water Co. v. Sandpoint (Idaho), 173 Pac.
972; Yeatrnan v. Towers (Md.), 95 Atl. 158; City of Scranton v. Pub.
Serv. Coin. (Pa.), 110 Atl. 775, Rutland Light Co. v. Burditt Bros,
(Vt.), 111 Atl. 582; Minn., Etc., R. Co. v. Menasha Wooden Ware Co.
(Wis.), 150 N. W 411, McCook Irrigation Co. v. Burtless (Neb.)', 152
X. W 334, Traverse City v. Mich. R. Coin. (Mich.), 168 N. W 481,
Grand Rapids, Etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell (Mich.), 168 N. W 961, Clute v.
Nassaue, Etc., Lighting Co., 195 N. Y. S. 84; City of Fulton v. Pub. Serv.
Corn. (Mo.), 204 S. W 386; Salt Lake City v. Utah Light, Etc., Co.,
52 Utah 210, 173 Pac. 556, 3 A. L. R. 715 and Note; West v. United Rys.
and Elec. Co., 155 Md. 572, 142 Atl. 870: Great Yorthern R. Co. v. Dept.
of Pub. Works, 161 Wash. 29 296 Pac. 142.
2For cases sustaining this rule, see note one.
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modify or annul the rates and fares of such companies.3 It is
to be remembered that a public utility company enjoys a privi-
lege that is necessarily of a monopolistic character, a privilege
granted by public authority, and from which a pecuniary
profit is derived, by accepting such a franchise or privilege
from the municipality such a company devotes its property to
a public use, and is therefore more subject to state control than
the ordinary private corporation. The authorities confirm the
doctrine that to regulate or alter rates to be charged by public
service corporations is an inherent attribute of sovereignty
which may be exercised at any time thru a state agency for
the purpose of establishing just, equitable and reasonable rates
under such circumstances as may exist at the time. It is seem-
ingly an attribute of sovereignty which caunot be contracted
away and in contemplation of which all such contracts are
made. Impliedly, from general powers, a muicipality may
have the authority to contract in the matter of public service
charges as long as the legislature does not exercise its reserved
power in that particular, but a contract so made is permissive
only, and is subject to future legislative action. However, the
fact that the contract may 'be overruled by a sovereign power
does not destroy the binding effect between the parties when it
is left undisturbed. 4 That such private contract rights must
yield to the public welfare, when the latter is appropriately de-
clared and defined and the two conflict, has been often decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Thus, in Man2gault
v Sprsngs5 it was declared that "It is the settled law of this
court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation
of contracts does not prevent the state from (properly) exercis-
ing such powers for the general good of the public,
though contracts previously entered into between individuals
may thereby be affected."
In Hudson County Water Co. v AcCarterO it is said that
"One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restric-
tion, cannot remove them from the power of the state by making
a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the in-
firmity of the subject matter."
'Ibid.
4 Southern Utilities Co. v. Palatka, 268 U. S. 232, 69 L. Ed. 930.
r199 U. S. 473; 50 L. Ed. 274, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127.
'209 U. S. 349; 52 L. Ed. 828; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529.
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In Loussville and N B. Co. v. Mottley7 this is quoted with
approval from the Legal Tender Cases -8 "Contracts must be
understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of the
rightful authority of the government, and no obligation of a
contract can extend to the defeat of legitimate government
authority "
It was said in Chicago B. and Q. B. Co. v McGtire .9 "There
is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or contract as one
chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legis-
lative supervision that wide department of activity wnch con-
sists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the
power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty iinplies the
absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the com-
munity "
And in Atlantso Coast Isne R. Co. v Goldsboro'0 the court
said. "It is settled that neither the 'contract' clause nor the
'due process' clause has the effect of overriding the power of
the state to establish all regulations that are reasonably neces-
sary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general
welfare of the community, that tns power can neither be ab-
dicated nor 'bargained away, and is inalienable even by express
grant, and that all contract and property rights are held sub-
ject to its fair exercise."
Thus, recognizing the general principle that a state may,
in its sovereign capacity, abrogate rate contracts, the question
arises as to the exceptions to this general statement, and under
what conditions a mumcipality may enter into an irrevocable
contract with a utility company that forbids abrogation by the
state.
That a state may authorize a municipal corporation to
establish public service rates by agreement, and thereby sus-
pend for a number of years, not grossly excessive, the exertion-
of governmental power by legislative action to fix compensation
to be paid for the services furished by public utility corpora-
7219 U. S. 467; 55 L. Ed. 297; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265.
812 Wall. 457; 20 L. Ed. 287.
9219 U. S. 567; 55 L. Ed. 338; 31,Sup. Ct. Rep. 259.
10232 U. S. 548; 58 L. Ed. 721, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364.
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tions, is recognized in a long line of decisions. 1 However, the
authority for a municipality to suspend legislative action and
therdby make inviolable rate contracts must clearly and unus-
takably appear; the presumption is against such a delegation
of power, and all doubts are resolved against the municipality 12
The rule was succinctly stated in Billings v Billings Gas o.
13
wherein the court said "Rate regulation of public utilities is
distinctly a legislative function of the state, and, though the
state may confer upon a city authority to enter into such a con-
tract for specific rates for a given period, since the effect of
such a contract is to extinguish pro tanto a governmental
power of first importance, the courts will not indulge the pre-
sumption that such a surrender of power has been made, unless
the legislative intention is expressed in clear and unnistakable
language or is necessarily implied from the powers expressly
granted, and all doubts will be resolved in favor of the continu-
ance of the power."
In Woodburn v Pulblic Ser vCe Commssswn 14 it was stated.
"Unless the right to exercise the police power of regulating
rates is referable to an unmistakable arant, the prices specified
n Railroad Com. v. Los Angeles R. Corp., 280 U. S. 145, 74 L. Ed.
234;Columbus, Etc., .Aght Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399, 63 L. Ed.
669; St. Cloud Pub. Serv. Co. v. St. Cloud, 265 U. S. 352, 68 L. Ed.
1050; Opelika v. Opelika Sewer Co., 265 U. S. 215, 68 L. Ed. 935,
Kentucky Power and Lzght Co. v. Maysville (D. C.), 36 Fed. (2nd) 816;
Home Tel. and Tel. Vo. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 53 L. Ed. 176;
Ala. Water Co. v. Attalla, 211 Ala. 301, 100 So. 490; Pocahontas v.
Central Power and Light Co., 152 Ark. 276, 244 S. W 712; Denver and
S. P R. Co. v. Englewood, 62 Colo. 229, 161 Pac. 151, 4 A. L. R. 956;
New Haven Water Co. v. New Haven, 106 Conn. 562, 139 Atl. 99;
Robertson v. Wilmington, Etc., Traction Co., 7 Boyce 155, 104 Atl. 139;
State ex rel. Buford v. Pinellas County Power Co., 87 Fla. 243, 100 So.
504, Sandpotnt Water Co. v. Sandpoznt (Idaho), supra, Winfield v.
Pub. Serv. Com., 187 Ind. 53, 118 N. E. 531, re Miss. Valley Tel. Co.,
P U. R. 1917B ,368; Ottumwa R. and Light Co. v. Ottumwa (Iowa),
178 N. W 905, re Guilford Wa-Ser Co., 118 Me. 367, 10S AtI. 452;
Traverse City v. Michigan R. Com., 202 Mich. 575, 168 N. W 481, State
ex rel Billings v. Billings Gas Co., 55 Mont. 102, 173 Pao. 799; Gallup
v. Gallup, Etc., Power Co., 29 N. M. 610, 225 Pac. 724, New York v.
-Interborough, Rapid Transit Co., 240 N.Y. S. 316; Woodburn v. Pub.
Serv. Con. (Ore.), supra, Uvaldi v. Uvaldi Elec. Co. (Texas), 250
S. W 140; Salt Lake City v. Utah light and Traction Co. (Utah),
173 Pac. 556; Richmond v. Va. R. and P Co., 141 Va. 69, 126 S. E. 353;
State ex rel. Webster v. Sup. Ct., 67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861, Charleston
v. Pub. Serv. orom., 86 W Va. 536,, 103 S. E. 673; Manitowoc v..Man-
'towoc and N. Traction Co., 145 Wis. 13, 129 N. W 925.
2Ibid.
13 55 Mont. 102; 173 Pac. 799.
1182 Ore. 114, 161 Pac. 391.
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in the franchise are not exempt from interference by the legisla-
tive assembly "
There are some few instances where it has been adjudged
that a municipal corporation has been granted the authority to
make an inviolable rate contract. In Ohio the municipalities
have comprehensive power under the state constitution to con-
tract with public utilities as to rates and such contracts have
been declared inviolable. Following a review of the pertinent
provisions of the constitution, statutes and decisions of Ohio,
the supreme court of that state, in Columbus v Public Servce
Commisson,15 said. "We have therefore reached the conclusion
that the rate stipulation is, upon reason and principle, a valid
condition to the consent contract. If the state has con-
ferred upon the municipality the power to make a valid contract,
including the stipulation of a rate, and if pursuant to such power
so given a contract has been made in winch a rate has been
stipulated and no review thereof is authorized then the
state has lost the power to revoke or revise such rate, because
the obligation of the contract and the rate therein established is
inviolable under the guaranty of both the state and the federal
constitutions." Under the more recent decisions in Ohio it
seems there is no authority to enable a municipality to make
an irrevocable rate contract for a period of more than ten
years, and the municipality cannot by a franchise for a longer
period (twenty-five years for example) make such an agreement
with a utility as will enable a municipality, at ten year intervals
during this time, to fix the rates beyond the power of the public
service commission to alter.16 There are numerous Ohio deci-
sions upholding the power of the municipalities to make in-
violable rate contracts.
1 7
Under the early decisions of Virginia it was held that the
municipalities had the authority to make inviolable rate con-
tracts with public utilities.' 8 However that rule must now ap-
parently be regarded as inapplicable in that state in view of
25 103 Ohio St. 79; 133 N.E. 800.
" United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ironton, 107 Ohio St. 173, 140 N. E. 884;
New Boston v. Pub. Utilities Com., 108 Ohio St. 352, 140 N. E. 607.
"Interurban R., Etc., Co. v. Pub. U. Crom., 98 Ohio St. 287, 120
N. E. 831, Toledo, Etc., Traction Co. v. Pub. U. Crom., 98 Ohio St. 305,
120 N. E. 835; Columbus, Etc., Inght Co. v. Columbus, supra; Mahon-
1&ng, Etc., Lsght Co. v. Pub. U. Com., 98 Ohio St. 303, 120 N. E. 835.
Va. Power Co. v. Clifton Forge, 125 Va. 469, 99 S. E. 723.
'K. L. J.-3
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the decision m the case of Victoria v Victoria, Etc., Ice Co.19
to the effect that mumcipalities have not the power to enter into
inviolable rate contracts, and that the state corporation com-
mission has the necessary jurisdiction to determine the reason-
ableness of rates regardless of contracts. It will be noted that
tis decision places Virgima in line with the great weight of
authority sustaining the right of the state commissions to alter
franchise or contract rates.
The decisions of the New York courts recognize the power
of the public service commission to change contract rates, but
hold that such power, as regards certain street railways, has
not been delegated to the regulatory body 20 The decisions of
that state are in line with the general trend of authority as
regards other utilities.
2 1
In some cities in Colorado whose charters have been framed
under the "Home Rule" provisions of the constitution, it has
been held that jurisdiction over public service rates is vested in
such cities, and the rates fixed therein by contract cannot be
abrogated. 22  To a limited degree the Colorado rule has been
followed in both Louisiana23 and in New Jersey 24
Kentucky being one of the few states without a regulatory
body to supervise public utility rates, it necessarily follows that
the exact question under consideration has never been adjudi-
cated in this Commonwealth. Section 201 e-23 of Carroll's
Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition, subjects any public service
company which has continued its service after the expiration
of its franchise to the jurisdiction and supervision of the Rail-
road Commission, and forbids it to withdraw such service with-
out permission of the Commssion so long as it remains in busi-
ness in any part of the state. In several cases the constitu-
"134 Va. 34, 114 S. E. 92.
Qusnby v. Pub. Serv. Com., 223 N. Y. 244, 119 N.E. 433; N. Y. v.
Interboroug Rapui Transit Co., 240 N. Y. S. 416.
21 International R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 226 N. Y. 474, 124 N. E.
123; Freeport v. Nassau Lnghting Co., 118 N. Y. S. 421, Pub. Serv. Com.
v. Pavilion Gas Co., 232 N. Y. 126, 133 N.E. 427; Mt. Mornts v. Pavilion
Gas Co., 183 N. Y. S. 792; North Hempstead v. Public Serv. Corp., 231
N. Y. 447, 132 N. E. 144.
2-Puebo v. Pub. U. Com., 68 Col. 155, 187 Pac. 1026; Golden, Etc.,
Co. v. Colorado Sprzngs Power Ca., 68 CJol. 588, 192 Pac. 493.
"Baton Rouge Water Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Corn., 156 La. 539, 100
So. 710.
"Federal Ship Builders Co. v. Bayonne (N. J.), 141 AtM 455, AfM,
144 At. 918.
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tionality of that statute has been assailed, but each time it was
adjudged that either the question was not presented or could
not be raised by the parties to the action.2 5 Therefore those
cases and the rulings therein will not be of any material aid in
enlightening a discussion of the present question.
The specific authority to regulate the rates of public utili-
ties in the municipalities of this Commonwealth, as set out in
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes 1930 edition, is somewhat at
variance, but does not in any instance confer a greater power
than to "fix and regulate" such charges. 26 Thus, the question
arises whether or not the General Assembly has by clear, dis-
tict and concise language conferred upon any municipal cor-
poration the necessary statutory authority to enter into- an
inviolable rate contract. In the case of City of Ludlow v
Unon, Inght, Heat and Power Co.27 the Court of Appeals in
construing a section of the Kentucky Statutes giving a city of
the fourth class the authority to "fix and regulate" rates, said
"By its specific terms it purports to bestow on the cities power
only to regulate rates and the quality of service being rendered
under charters or franchises." The 'Supreme Court of the
United States has both in the case of Home Telepho-ne Co. v
Los Angeles and in St. Cloud Public Sermce Company v. St.
Cloud 2s explicity decided that words such as "fix and regulate"
is no authority to "abandon the governmental power itself
P it authorized command but not agreement. It
authorizes the exercise of the governmental power and nothing
else." Under the inducement of the highest authority the
logical construction to be placed upon such a delegation of
power as exists in this state does no more than confer on the
municipalities the right to exercise a mere delegated authority,
in acting as agents of the state. It would be strange, indeed,
if the state, which has the authority to terminate the powers of
the municipality created by it, could not revoke authority
granted by it to them, and, in the exercise of its sovereign
power, cancel conditions which it had permitted them to impose
- City of Ludlow v. Unon. Light Heat and Power Co., 231 Ky. 813,
22 S.W (2nd) 909; Union Light Heat and Power Co. v. Ft. Thomas,
215 Ky. 389, 285 S. W 228; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commss-
.son, 218 U. S. 300, 73 L. Ed. 390, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150.
mKy. Stat., sections 3290-5, 3490-36, 3637-1, 3704-1.
-' City of Ludlow v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co., supra.
'211 U. S. 265, 53 L. Ed. 176; 265 U. S. 352; 68 L. Ed. 1050.
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upon other classes of corporations wich had also been created
by the state.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has, in many of its
opinions, recognized that the fixing of rates and tolls is a legis-
lative function, that to fix such charges comes within the gov-
ernmental or police powers of the state and not under its con-
tractual powers, that such governmental power, if it can be
bargained away at all, it must be in words of positive grant, or
something which is in law equivalent. In one of the early-toll
,bridge cases of Gomnmonwealth v. Covington Bridge 0o.29 it
was recognized that rate making is a legislative function, and
can only be bargained away by words of express grant
"Nevertheless the power to regulate tolls, and in this class of
cases, being the exercise of a governmental power, as must be con-
.ceded, its exercise may be resumed at any moment, unless by contract
the state has surrendered it. The power of regulation is a
power of government, and, if it can be bargained away at all, it can
only be done by words of express grant, or something which is in law
equivalent. If there is reasonable doubt it must be resolved in favor
of the existence of the power. The rule is elementary, and the cases
in which it has been considered and applied are numerous."
This case was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States,30 but on the ground that the regulation of the bridge
tolls was an interference with interstate commerce. Hence that
ruling does not detract from the Kentucky court's reasoning and
statements on that phase of the case relative to the governmental
power.
The court ruled in Winchester Turnipike Co. v. Croxton
3 1
that in the case of a corporation whose property is affected with
a public interest and which is therefore essentially public in
its nature, the reservation of the legislative authority to act is
understood unless clearly negatived in express words or by nec-
essary implication. In the course of the opinion it was said.
"But the property of -the corporation in this instance is affected
with a public use. Its corporate nature is essentially public, and the
rule is that the charters of such corporations are not protected from
legislative interference unless in unmistakably clear language the
state has indicated a deliberate purpose not to interfere for all time
to come."
In constring the grant of a lottery franchise in the case of
Commonwealth v. Douglas,32 it was stated
-14 Ky. L. R. 836, 21 S. W 1042.
30 154 U. S. 224, 38 L. Ed. 970.
98 Ky. 739, 34 S. W 518, 33 L. R. A. 177.
-(Ky.) 24 S.W. 233.
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"But apart from -the binding force of the decision, it seems that its
logic is conclusive and convincing in drawing the distinction between
the contractual power of the state, to-wit, that the provision of the
federal constitution in reference to contracts only inhibits the states
from passing laws impairing the obligation of such contracts as relate
to property rights, but not to subjects that are purely governmental.
The reason for this distinction must be apparent to all, for, when we
consider that honesty, morality, religion and education are the main
pillars of the state, and for the protection and promotion of which
government was instituted among men, it at once strikes the mind
,that the government, through Its agents cannot throw off these trust
duties by selling, bartering or giving them away. The preservation
of the trust is essential to the happiness and welfare of the bene-
ficiaries, which the trustees have no power to sell or give away. If
It be conceded that the state can give, sell and barter away any one
pf them, it follows that it can thus surrender its control, of all
and thus deprive the state of its power to repeal the grants and all
control of the subjects, so far as the grantees are concerned.
As said, we are bound by the construction given to the federal constitu-
tion by thq supreme court, relating to the impairment of contracts by
the states and that the matter of such grants being strictly
'within the. police power of the state, the state could not sell or barter
away its control of the subject."
The rule was recognized and succinctly stated m the case
of German Insurance Company v. Commonwealth .33
"It may also be here noted that altho the constitution of the
United States forbids any state from impairing by constitution or
law the obligations of a contract, there is yet the exception to this
general rule that the state cannot contract away its police power or
its right to abrogate or annul contracts it has made in contravention
of this power, and so, altho the state may have entered into a con-
tract that would ordinarily be binding upon it, and beyond its power
to Impair, it may yet avoid a contract so entered into, if by the con-
tract the state undertook to part with its police power."
In Kentucky Traction and Termnial Company v. Murray,
3 4
is was said
"We are unable to see that the refusal of the relief sought by the
appellees will constitute such an impairment of the obligation of the
contract here involved as would violate article 1, section 10, Const.
U. S. Wthe right of the states to enforce the provisions of its con-
stitution and those .of its statutes enacted in pursuance thereto, look-
ing to the proper exercise of the police power, cannot be questioned,
and those provisions are to be considered as carried into and made a
part of every contract between a common carrier and an individual.
The contention of the appellee that the contract was valid when made
and that its performance was enforceable disregards the
fundamental rule of contracts referred to, viz., that all laws in exist-
ence when the contract Is made or thereafter enacted in pursuance
,f the police power of the state, necessarily enter into and form a
part of it as fully as If they were expressly incorporated into Its terms.
An excellent statement of it will be found in Pinney and Boyle v. Los
3 141 Ky. 606, 133 S.W. 793.
", 176 Ky. 593, 195 S.W. 1119.
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Angeles Gas and Electric Corporation, 168 Cal. 12, 141 Pac. 620, L. R. A.
1915C 282, Ann. Cases 1915D 471. 'A word perhaps should be added
touching the asserted violation of the provisions of the contract be-
tween the company and the plaintiff by the enforcement of the terms
of the regulatory ordinance. Upon this it is sufficient to say that it
will be conclusively presumed that the parties contracted in contempla-
tion of the power of the proper board or tribunal to fix rates in every
case where such power exists and may have been thereafter legally
exercised' (citing cases)."
From the foregoing excerpts of the Kentucky cases it is
easily discerned with what jealousy the courts look upon a dele-
gation of the governmental or police power of the state. It
naturally follows that when a municipality enters into a con-
tract with a public service corporation, in its legislative capacity,
it is presumed that the parties entered into the contract with
the knowledge that the right of the state to exercise the police
power in the future is reserved, and that, where the common
weal and the interest of the public demand that the provisions
of the contract thus entered into shall be modified, it can be
done without any violation of the provisions of the Constitution
of the United States with reference to the impairment of the
obligations of contracts.
Altho any decision of a Federal District Court, in con-
struing a state statute, is not binding on the State Court, it is,
however, highly persuasive. In the case of Kentucky Power
and Itght Company v City of Maysvile,35 from the Eastern
District of Kentucky, the Court commented on the surrender of
the rate regulatory power of the state. There the state, in 1854,
had given to the Maysville Gas Company the right to furnish
gas to the inhabitants of the City of Maysville upon such terms
as "may be agreed upon" Later, in 1886, the Citizens Gas
Light Company was created 'by the General Assembly and a
part of its charter provided that it be allowed to furnish gas
to the citizens of the City of Maysville "by contract with
them" These two companies, heretofore mentioned, were
finally merged into the Kentucky Power and Light Company
In May, 1929, the City of Maysville enacted an ordinance fixing
a maximum rate to be charged by the Kentucky Power and
Light Company The latter company sought to enjoin the en-
forcement of the ordinance on the theory that under the charter
provisions of the Maysville Gas Company and Citizens Gas
"i36 Fed. (2nd) 816.
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Light Company power was conferred on those two. corporations
to charge such rates as "may be agreed upon" between the two
such companies and the citizens, and that the Kentucky Power
and Light Company, as successor to the two former companies,
enjoyed the same right, and that any attempt on the part of
the Commonwealth, or any agency thereof, to interfere with
such right, by a regulation of the rates charged, constituted the
impairment of the obligation of a contract. It was held that
the authority bestowed upon the City of Maysville by a state
statute giving the city the authority to regulate rates super-
seded any rights granted by charter to the Gas Companies. In
the course of the opinion it was said.
"The power to regulate rates of public utilities is inherent in
every sovereignty. It is legislative in character and is a part of the
police power. The state may, within limits, contract with a utility
as to the rates to be charged, yet it may well be doubted if, under
the modern rule, it can irrevocably surrender all regulatory power.
Certainly no such surrender is to be presumed. On the contrary every
presumption is against any such surrender. " (Citing cases.)
"It does not seem to me, however, that the two charter provisions
relied upon irresistibly compel the conclusion that it was the intention
of the legislature to forever surrender the power of the state, by
legislative action, to regulate the rates of the two companies referred
to, and to leave the question of the reasonableness of such rates to
be dealt with by the courts as the occasion might arise. A more
reasonable construction is that these two charter provisions conferred
upon the two corporations the right to make valid and enforceable
contracts as to the rates to be charged, subject always to the rate
regulatory power of the state
Both municipal and private corporations are but creatures
of the state and can exercise only such powers as are expressly
granted or may be necessarily implied from the charter. Thus,
a corporation, under this decision, may have specific authority
to contract as to rates, yet such contracts are always under the
supervision of the state and may be changed, abrogated or
regulated at any tine by the state or its agent. As hereinbefore
stated, tis decision would not be binding on the state court,
yet it is bighly inducive to the view that it would have great
weight in the decision of a similar question by the state court.
In many instances the contention has been made that the
power of a municipality to control the use of its streets and to
forbid the operation and construction of designated public
utilities without its consent, gives to the said municipality the
right to enter into inviolable rate contracts. However, the
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courts, with few exceptions, have decided that such a right did
not deprive the legislature of its authority to fix rates or to
authorize a public service commission to do so. The trend of
authority is to the effect that a constitutional or statutory pro-
vision stating that the consent of the local authorities, having
control of the streets and highways sought to be occupied, is re-
quired in order that a public utility may construct its lines,
pipes, conduits, etc., is but a limitation of the general powers of
the legislature and in one particular only It does not by im-
plication or otherwise attempt to divest the state of its para-
mount authority and control of the streets and highways, nor
does it deprive the legislature of its authority to fix rates for
such companies. The various courts' reasoning is to the effect
that the streets and highways are for the use and benefit of all
the citizens of the state, that the question of rates of public
utility companies is not one of local concern, merely, or local
politics, and that it would be a strained and unreasonable con-
tention to say that any such provision of the law was intended
to give to the corporate authorities the right to fix rates under
varying conditions and to thus supersede the sovereign power
of the state.
In Missouri it was held that a constitutional provision
against granting the right to construct and operate a street rail-
way within any city without the consent of the local authorities
is rather a limitation on the power of the legislature and cannot
be construed as a delegation of power to fix and regulate
rates.36
In Illinois it was decided that constitutional provision re-
quiring municipal consent to the construction and operation of
street railways does not confer on the corporate authorities the
right to contract as to rates free from legislative authority, and
that it would be unreasonable to say that the legislature had
such power.
37
The great weight of authority is to the effect that the power
of a municipality to make irrevocable rate contracts is not to
be inferred or implied from the power granted to such munici-
68St. Louis v. Pub. Serv. Oom. (Mo.), 207 S.W 799; State ex rel.
Garner v. Mo. and K. Tel. Co., 189 Mo. 83, 89 S. W 41.
11 Chicago v. Chicago, 292 Ill. 190, 126 N.E. 585; Pub. Util. Cor.
v. Quincy, 290 Ill. 360, 125 N. E. 374; State Com. v. Chicago, Etc., 275
11. 555, 114 N. E. 325.
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pality to control its streets or to regulate the use thereof by
public utilities. 8
The decisions of Maryland and North Dakota have sus-
tamed the view that when conditions, such -as the fixing of
- rates, are coupled with the permission or grant to use the streets,
and such permission or grant is accepted by the utility company,
then, all conditions or restrictions attached thereto become bind-
ing; thus, the rates so fixed are controlled by the obligations
resulting from the contract. However, in the North Dakota
case the court held that the power to change contract rates had
not been delegated to the public service commission, and the
question as to whether the commission could ehange the rates
if such authority had been delegated was not decided.89
In this connection it is to be noted that some reliance has
been place on section 163 of the Kentucky Constitution in at-
tempting to sustain the view that the jurisdiction of a public
service commission, if established in this Commonwealth, could
not be successfully exerted to the extent of abrogating existing
rate contracts. That section of the Constitution reads as follows
"163. STREETS NOT TO BE TAKEN XBY PRIVATE CORPORATION WITH-
OUT CONSENT; EXCEPTION.
No street railway, gas, water, steam heating, telephone, or electric
light company, within a city or town, shall be permitted to authorize
or construct its tracks, lay its pipes or mains, or erect poles, posts
or other apparatus along, over, under or across the streets, alleys or
,other public grounds of a city or town, without the consent of the
proper legislative bodies or boards of such city or town being first
obtained; but when charters have been heretofore granted conferring
such rights, and work has in good faith been begun thereunder, the
provisions of this section shall not apply."
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has never decided
whether or not the foregoing section gives to a mumcipality the
authority to enter into an irrevocable rate contract. However,
'8Salt Lake City v. Utah Light, Etc., Co. (Utah), 173 Pac. 556;
Tempe v. Mountain Tel. Co. (Ariz.), Jacksonville v. Sou. Bell Tel. Co.,
57 Fla. 374, 49 So. 509; Lewtsville Natural Gas Co. v. State, 135 Ind.
49, 34 N.E. 702, 21 L. R. A. 734; Mills v. Chicago, 127 Fed. 731, State v.
Cheyboygan, 11 Wis. 23, 86 N. W 657, Pub. Util. Com. v. Chtcago.
supra; Traverse City v. Michigan R. Commisston, 202 Mich. 575, 207
S.W. 799; Edgewood v. Pub. Serv. Commsssion, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 280,
affirmed in 269 Pa. 342, 113 Atl. 79; Scranton v. Pub. Serv. Com., 268
Pa. 192, 110 Atl. 775, Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Com., 86 W. Va. 536;
103 S. E. 673; Milwaukee Electrc R. and Light Co. v. Milwaukee, 173
Wis. 329, 181 N. W 298; Chieago v. O'Connell, 278 Ill. 591, 116 N. E.
210, McQuillin Municipal Corp., Sec. 1880.
,'Chas. Simons Sons Co. v. Maryland Tel. Co., 99 Md. 141, 57 Atl.
193; Chrysler Light and Power Co. v. Belfield (N. D. ), 224 N. W 871,
63 A. L.R. 1337.
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in the ease of Winchester v Winchester Waterworks Company,40
appealed from the Eastern District of Kentucky, and involving
a section of the Statutes of this State, it was said.
"Independently of a right to control and regulate the rates to be
charged for public service reserved in a grant of a franchise or right
to use the city streets, a city or other municipality has no power to
regulate the rates to be charged by water, lighting, or other public
service corporations in the absence of express or plain legislative
authority to do so. 3 Dill. Mun. Corp., 5th Ed., sec. 1325. Nor does
such authority arise from the power to regulate the opening and use
of streets, nor a grant of the general right to control and regulate
the right to erect works and lay pipes in the streets of the city"
(citing cases).
An analysis of the numerous cases is highly inducive to
the belief that in this instance the majority view is the better
view and that, by analogy, the Kentucky Court will follow the
great weight of authority
To uphold the principle of law enunciating the inviolability
of rate contracts, greatest reliance is placed on section 164 of the
Kentucky Constitution, which reads as follows
"164. FRA~icnisE on PRIVILEGE NOT To BE GRANTED Fop LONGER
THAN TWENTY YEARS; SALE OF; EXCEPTION.
No county, city, town, taxing district or other municipality shall
be authorized or permitted to grant any franchise or privilege, or
make any contract in reference thereto, for a term exceeding twenty
years. Before granting such franchise or privilege for a term of
years, such municipality shall first, after due advertisement, receive
bids therdfor publicly, and award the same to the highest and best
bidder; but it shall have the right to reject any or all bids. Thin
section shall not apply to a trunk railroad."
The words "franchise or privilege, or make any contract
in reference thereto," of the foregoing section, affords the prin-
cipal and basic ground for the belief that this Commonwealth
cannot, itself or thru -an agency, abrogate existing rate con-
tracts. This impression is derived in main from the words
"or make any contract in reference thereto," and it is the be-
lief that this language is so used to denote any contract that
may be made or that may arise from the granting of a franchise,
including rate contracts. IMi other words, the contention has
been made that the foregoing provision gives to a municipality
the authority to enter into an inviolable rate contract which is
beyond the power of the state to -alter in any degree. In the
light of the great weight of authority, and the principles ap-
4251 U. S. 192; 64 L. Ed. 221.
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plicable to the construction of statutes or constitutional provi-
sions delegating such power, this position is not tenable.
The legislature may, unless probitited by the constitution
of the respective state, delegate authority to a municipality to
contract as to rates for -a period not unreasonable m point of
time so that future legislative action cannot, m any way, alter
such contract rates.4 1 However, it is settled beyond controversy
that a mumcipal corporation cannot enter m an inviolable rate
contract which will be beyond the power of the state to alter
unless the authority to enter into such an agreement has been
conferred m such strong and positive language as will neces-
sarily warrant a finding that such power has been delegated. 42
It has been stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Day, that "The fixing of
rates which may be charged by public service corporations is a
legislative function of the state, and while the right to make
contracts which shall prevent the state during a given period
from exercising this important power has been recognized and
approved by judicial decisions, it has been uniformly held, by
tns court, that the renunciation of a sovereign right of this
character must be evidenced by terms so clear and uneqivocal
as to permit of no doubt as to their proper construction." 4 3
Many times in the application of this general principle, the
courts have held that the language used in a statute or other
provision was not sufficient to clearly portray the intention of
delegating the sovereign power. For example, in Wisconsin
it was decided by the state supreme court, and affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, that power conferred upon
a municipality to grant permission to construct and operate
street railways in its streets "upon such terms as the proper
authorities shall determine" did not give to the municipal cor-
poration the power to make a binding contract as to rates so
as to prevent interference by the state.44
In Freeport Water Company v Freeport City,4 5 it was
held that a statute authorizing a municipality "to contract for
a supply of water for public use for a period ot exceeding
4 See notes, 11.
4 See notes, 38.43Milwaukee R. Co. v. Railroad Cor. of wis., 238 U. S. 174, 59
L. Ed. 1254.
- Ibid.
4180 U. S. 587; 45 L. Ed. 679.
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thirty years" and to authorize private persons to construct
waterworks and "maintain the same at such rates as may be
Axed by ordinance, and for a period not exceeding thirty years"
did not confer authority upon the municipal authorities to con-
tract so as to exempt the water company from the exercise of
the governmental power to fix rates.
Also where charter authority was granted to the common
council of a municipal corporation "to regulate telephone serv-
ice and the use of telephone within the city and to fix
and determine the charges for the telephones and telephone
service and connections" it conferred no authority to enter into
a contract fixing rates so that they could not be changed, and
the court said. "This is an ample authority to exercise the
governmental power of regulating charges, but it is no authority
to enter into a contract to abandon the governmental power
itself." 46
The rule was likewise stated in St. Cloud Public Servwe
Company v. St. Cloud,47 as follows. "And we do not think
that this contractual power was limited by the proviso that the
council should have the right to 'regulate -and prescribe' the
rates and charges of the companies to which it nught grant the
right of constructing such works. It is true that standing alone
this proviso, in the absence of any state decision to the contrary
would, under the construction given snuilar language in Home
Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles be regarded as conferring
authority merely to exercise the governmental power of regulat-
ing rates, and not authority to enter into a contract."
From the language used in the foregoing cases upon which
the right was claimed to enter into an inviolable contract, it is
discerned that the authority to make such a contract must be
specific or necessarily implied. Generally speaking, and logically
understood, the reason for a strict construction of such a delega-
tion of power seems to rest on the fact that it tends to suspend
the sovereign right to regulate the service and to alter the rates
of public service corporations as changing conditions warrant
or justify, and, which, but for the contract would always be
available to change when necessary, also that any delegation of
governmental power is viewed with jealousy and disfavor. If
46211 U. S. 265; 53 L. Ed. 176.
4"265 U. S. 352; 68 L. Ed. 1050.
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the position of those who challenge the authority of the state,
or its agent, to abrogate rate contracts be sustained it would
have to be on a mere inference, not necessarily implied from a
reading of section 164, supra, nor in conformity with the rule
prevalent in practically every jurisdiction in strictly and closely
scrutinizing such a delegation of power. It is to be noted that
the term rate, or any term synonnous, is not anywhere men-
tioned in either section 163 or 164 of the Kentucky. Constitu-
tion. The latter section relates. to the sale of franchises only,
and necessarily the authority to make a contract, as mentioned
in that section, is such as relates only to the franchise. A con-
tract in strict reference to the franchise is necessary and is
universally separate and apart from the question of rates. No-
where in the Constitutional Debates of 1890 can -be found any
word that will intimate it was the intention of the framers of
that instrument to delegate to the municipalities of this Com-
monwealth the authority to enter into irrevocable rate contracts,
on the contrary it seems the intention of that body was to obtain
money for the municipalities from a sale of a franchise as men-
tioned in section 164. The following statement, made by the
Hon. Bennett H. Young, is taken from pages 2131 and 2132 of
the Debates.
"In this state most valuable municipal franchises have been be-
stowed upon favorites or schemers, and the municipal treasury robbed
of millions of dollars. The franchises in the city of Louisville, given
away or secured by an improper influence over its council, would today
pay over one half of its ten millions of debt. Almost every street
has been covered with railways, every sidewalk lined with telephone
and electric poles, many passways filled with conduits for wires, and
never a single dollar gone into the treasury of the city. This great
population has not been gathered without vast outlay, and these
streets have only been built by the expenditure of millions of money,
and many franchises must be of enormous value. Upon what system
of government or What process of reasomng can the granting of
franchises worth millions to aliens or favorites be justified? These
franchises honestly and justly belong to the people at large, to the
municipality itself, and they should be disposed of for the benefit of
the body-politic, and not handed over to a few unscrupulous municipal
leeches in the name of decent, honest and, respectable govern-
ment, let us declare by the organic law that the value of such franchise
shall go into the public treasury, and not be farmed out to corruptionists
and robbers."
This seems to have been the idea that was prevalent in the
minds of the framers of the Kentucky Constitution, and, thus,
was the legislative intent. Further the very fact that this sec-
tion of the Constitution has never been regarded by any of the
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General Assembly of this Commonwealth as a grant of author-
ity to municipalities, or as a complete delegation by the state of
its sovereign power, to regulate rates and by contract, franchise
or otherwise, to agree upon a scale of charges which would
operate as a bar to the exercise of the governmental power by
the state, is -convincingly shown in the various acts expressly
conferring authority upon the municipal corporations to merely
regulate rates, and also in the regulatory powers conferred on
the Railroad Cominssion to hear complaints and fix the rates
to be charged by those utilities and under those conditions
named in section 201-e et sequens of Carrolls Kentucky Statutes,
1930 edition, and supplement thereto.
Further, it is entirely proper and competent for the legisla-
ture, in granting a public utility franchise, to control the
grantee in its exercise, and where one of the conditions of the
grant is that the legislature may alter or revoke the franchise or
privilege, the enactment of such a law, abrogating the provisions
of the grant, cannot be said to impair the obligations of a con-
tract.
By the decision in the earliest and leading case of Dart-
mouth College v Woodward48 it wvas established that a grant
from a state to a private -corporation created a contract within
the meamng of that clause of the federal constitution forbidding
any state from impairing the obligation of a contract. Mr.
Justice Story in his concurring opinion in that case, took occa-
sion to say "If the legislature means to claim such an author-
ity (authority to 'change the provisions of a grant), it must be
reserved in the grant." After that decision many of the states
in the Union, in order to secure to its legislative body the exer-
cise of a fuller parliamentary power over corporations than
would otherwise exist, inserted either in its statutes or in its
constitution a provision that privileges thenceforth granted
should be subject to revocation, alteration or repeal at the
pleasure of. the legislature. Thus, though under the Dartmouth
College case, supra, a legislative grant to a private corporation
of special privileges may be a contract, but, where one of the
provisions or conditions of the grant is that the legislature may
alter or revoke the grant, the enactment of such a law will not
impair the character of such privileges and cannot be regarded
48 4 Wheat 518; 4 L. Ed. 629.
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as one impairing the obligation of a contract. Whatever may
be the motive of the legislature, or however harshly such legisla-
tion may operate in a particular case or upon the parties inter-
ested, the corporation, by accepting the grant subject to the
legislative power so reserved 'by a constitutional or statutory
provision, must 'be held to have assented to such a reservation
of authority Corporations are but creatures of the state and
are endowed with only such faculties as the state bestows, and
are subject to such restrictions and conditions as the state im-
poses, and, if the power to alter or amend privileges granted to
such corporations is reserved, the reservation is a part of the
contract, and no change witln the legitimate exercise of that
power can be said to impair its obligations. This rule has been
cleaIl'y and succinctly stated and upheld in numerous deci-
sions. 49
Thus, with the rule heretofore stated in mind, we come to
an inspection of the provisions of the statutes and constitution
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky relative to the power of the
General Assembly to abrogate, in any manner, the provisions
of a franchise, whether granted 'by the state, or its properly
delegated agency, the municipality
Section 3 of the Bill of Rights in the Kentucky Constitu-
tion reads, in part, as follows. "and every grant of a franchise,
privilege or exemption, shall remain subject to revocation, altera-
tion or amendment." Under this provision it was plainly the
intent of the drafters of the Kentucky Constitution to reserve to
the law making body of this State supreme control over
franchises whether granted by the state or a municipality This
is evidenced by a reading of the Constitutional Debates of
1890 where, in several of the Debates, the point was explicitly
4 ity of Pawhuska v. Pawzuska Oil and Gas Co., 250 U. S. 394,
63 L. Ed. 1054; San Antonio, Etc., R. Co. v. San Antonio, 255 U. S. 547,
65 L. Ed. 777; Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co., 105 U. S. 13, 26 L.
Ed. 961, Lawrence v. Rutla-nd R. Co., 67 Atl. 1091, 80 Vt. 370, 15
L. R. A. (N. S.) 350; Hamilton Gas, Etc., Co. v. Hamilton, 46 U. S. 258,
36 L. Ed. 963; Maynard v. Looker, ll Mich. 49S, 56 L. lb. A. 947, Mo.,
Kan., Etc., 1. Co. v. Hickman, 183 U. S. 53, 46 L. Ed. 79; State v.
Light, Etc., Development Co. (Mo.), 152 S. W 67- Atlantic, Etc., R. Co.
v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359, 25 L. Ed. 185; Opelika v. Opelika Sewer Co.,
265 U. S. 215, 68 L. Ed. 985, Supreme Council Catholic Knights v. Fen-
wick, 169 Ky. 269, 183 S. W 906, Kentucky Insurance Co. v. Giffin, 66
Ky. 592; 12 IL C. L., page 211, sec. 36, Fletcher Cyc. Corp., Vol. 7, page
814, see. 3668 et seq. Thompson Corp., 2iid E6d,, Vol. 3, pag s 7,1-782,
sec. 2866; Cooley Const. Lim., 8th Ed., c. 9, page 563, note 1.
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brought out that it was the intention of that body to take all
grants and privileges from under the rule of the Dartmouth
College case and place such grants under the supervision of the
state in its sovereign capacity
The following statement was made in volume one, page
472 of the Constitutional Debates of 1890, by the Honorable
Proctor Knott
"Let us have no more of it here. Let every franchise be revocable
at the will of the legislature, whenever it shall see proper, but place
those to whom it may have been granted precisely in the position they
were before the grant was made. Rob them of nothing. Save to them
and their legal representatives all property rights they have acquired
thereunder. This can injure no man, while it is but just to the people
that any franchise should be recalled whenever its exercise shall be-
come hurtful to-the public interest."
He again expressed that view on page 739 of the same
volume
"I would say, what he seems not to have observed, that the very
object of this provision is to avoid the disastrous consequences of the
celebrated Dartmouth College case, to which he alludes."
On page 594 of the Debates, the Honorable Leslie T. Apple-
gate said
"That law means simply that the Legislature in the future shall
have the right to control all grants that are given by them; that in
other words, when you create or incorporate a company of any kind,
that they hold their incorporation subject to the sovereign will."
Honorable George Washington, on page 710 of volume one
of the Debates, quoted from Cooley on Constitutional Lnita-
tions in the following language
"Perhaps the most interesting question which arises in this dis-
cussion is, whether it is competent for the legislature to so bind up
its own hands by a grant so as to preclude it from exercising for the
future any of the essential attributes of sovereignty, in regard to any
of the subjects within its jurisdiction."
Further-
"It would seem therefore to be the prevailing opinion, and one
based upon sound reason, that the State cannot barter away, or in
any manner abridge or weaken, any of those essential powers which
are inherent in all governments,-and the existence of which, in full
vigor, is important to the well-being of organized society; and that
,any contracts to that end are void upon general principles, and cannot
be saved from invalidity by the provision of the national Constitution
now under consideration."
Obviously, from a reading of the Constitutional Debates of
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1890 on Article 3 of the Bill of Rights, it was intended that
the legislature should have the right of revocation and amend-
ment, and that whomsoever took a franchise or privilege should
take it subject to that right.
By section 1987 of Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edi-
tion, enacted a year after the present Constitution was adopted.
it is further shown that the legislature wanted it unequivocally
understood that all franchises and privileges should always be
subject to the sovereign powers of the state. That section reads
as follows
"All charters and grants of or to corporations, or amendments
thereof, enacted or granted since the fourteenth of February, one
thousand eight hundred and fifty six, and all other statutes, shall be
subject to repeal at the will of the general assembly, unless a contrary
intent be therein plainly expressed: Provided, that whilst privileges
and franchises so granted may be repealed, no repeal shall impair
other rights previously vested."
From the quotations, supra, the intent is logically deduced
that the drafters of the state Constitution and the General
Assembly of 1893 wanted the rule clearly enunciated and placed
in the laws of this Commonwealth that the state could not barter
or contract away its legislative or governmental powers, and
thus under no conditions could grant an irrevocable franchise
or privilege. Thus, it follows as a natural sequence that such
reserved authority affects the entire relationship between the
state and a public service corporation and places under legisla-
tive control all rights, privileges and immunities derived from
such grant. So, the right of a public utility company to operate
and to charge rates for the service rendered being dependent
upon the franchise, it follows, the legislature having the supreme
authority over the franchise itself, that it would have control
over the rates of such company 50
Even aside from the power of the state to vary or annul
the franchise of a utility company, there is further authority
in the Kentucky Constitution that amply retains to the legisla-
tive body of that state complete control over the rates of such
compames. Secion 195 of the Constitution reads in part as
follows
. and the exercise of police powers of this Commonwealth
shall never be abridged, nor so construed as to permit corporations to
50 Cooley Const. Lim., supra and note-also cases to note 49.
K. L. J.-4
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conduct their business in such manner as to infringe upon the equal
-rights of individuals."
There was very little argument on the foregoing section in
the Constitutional Debates of 1890, but there were several
statements made relative to the police power of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky On page 3686 of volume three of the
Debates, Hon. Hansom Kennedy made the following statement
"It is a well'established doctrine that the state cannot
surrender the power of eminent domain, nor can the state sur-
render the exercise of its police power." On the same page
and in the same volume, the Honorable J. F Askew said.
19 that the police power of the state remained intact, and
nothing could be done by one legislature to impair it. That being
true, now is a good time for us to put it beyond doubt in our
Constitution."
It has been stated, supra, and is now settled beyond all
doubt that rate-making is a governmental function and comes
within the police power of the state. In no state in the Umon
has the police power been more zealously guarded than in tls
Commonwealth. In German Insurance Co. v Commonwealth,
supra, it was said "the state cannot contract away its police
power or its right to abrogate or annul contracts made in con-
travention of this power." In Kentucky Tractwn and Terminal
Company v Murray, supra, the following statement was made
"all laws in existence when the contract is made or thereafter
enacted in pursuance of the police power of the state, neces-
sarily enter into and form a part of it (the contract) as fully
as if they were expressly incorporated into its terms."
In Northern Pacific R. Company v Diduth,51 the court said
"The exercise of the police power cannot be limited by contract
for reasons of public policy, nor can it be destroyed by compromise,
and it is immaterial upon what consideration the contracts rest, as
it is beyond the authority of the state or the municipality to abrogate
this power so necessary to the public safety" (citing cases).
In Atlantic Coast Jlne R. B. Co. v Goldsboro,5 2 it was
stated
"For it is settled that neither the 'contract' clause nor the 'due
process' clause has the effect of overriding the power of the state to
establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the
health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the commu-
51 208 U. S. 583; 52 L. Ed. 630.
51232 U. S. 548; 58 L. Ed. 721.
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nity; that this power can neither be abdicated not bargained away, and
is inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract and prop-
erty rights are held subject to its fair exercise."
Again in L. and N B. Company v Mottley,5 3 which in-
volved rates, the court said.
"If the legislature has no power to alter its police laws when con-
tracts would be affected, then the most important and valuable reforms
might be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for
that purpose. No doctrine to that effect would be even plausible, much
less sound and tenable."
In view of the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, section 195 of the Kentucky Constitution, and the
rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States, coupled
with the discussion supra of the police power, the mandatory
result is that every contract entered into fixing rates between
a municipality of this Commonwealth and a public utility com-
pany is always subject to change by the paramount power of
the state. It is equally as well settled that though the franchise
may be granted and the rates contracted for by a mumicpality
of the state, yet it would be only acting as agent of the state,
and, as principal, the state may at any time waive any of its
rights therein and vary the contract under its sovereign
authority
Following a discussion of the foregoing legal principles, it
may be said, in addition, that rules of law do not stand alone,
separate and apart from other rules and motives that govern
and guide our daily life. Correct rules of law are based upon
and supported by moral and economic principles. Thus, we are
confronted with the query-In what manner is public con-
vemence, prosperity and public welfare benefited by the abroga-
tion of public utility rate contractsq
The representatives of the people were able to convince the
courts that if the consumer had no recourse, under the police
power, to change rate contracts, then he was at the mercy of the
public service corporations in cases where, thru fraud or
political manipulation, unfair or unjust rates had been con-
tracted for a long period of time, or when, thru science or in-
vention or a decrease in prices, the cost of rendering the service
had been materially lessened so that rates fixed by the contract
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were unreasonable and exorbitant. This argument was both
understood and practised by the public, and was recognized and
sustained by the courts.
However, it is very difficult to convince a consumer that
an increase in rates fixed by contract will, in any way, enhance
the prosperity, public convenience and general welfare of the
community Tins, however, to an extent, is true. The service
rendered by a public utility company is necessary, likewise the
quality and continuity of that service must be maintained. It
requires capital to render the service and unless the business
is remunerative, or has a good prospect to earn a fair return
on the physical value of the property, capital will avoid that
particular public service corporataon, so as to make it impossi-
ble for the corporation to make those improvements and those
extensions necessary to the needs of the community Further
if economic conditions have so radically changed that the rate
fixed by contract has become confiscatory and there appears no
immediate relief therefrom except by an increase in rates, then
the utility corporation should receive the increase, or, upon
failure to do so, will either go into a receivership, cease opera-
tion or reduce the quality of the service so that it may continue
to operate under the confiscatory rate. A receivership would
result in added expense to be paad out of the rates received,
cessation of operation would entail a loss to the community, and
a reduction iii the quality of service would be necessarily
detrimental to the consumer. Where an increase in rates is
requisite to attract capital necessary to make extensions and
improvments, or to insure the quality and continuity of the
service rendered, such an increase could logically and reason-
ably be said to promote the public welfare and convenience.
However, aside from the aforesaid reasons it is only just
and equitable that a public service corporation be entitled to
earn a fair return upon the physical value of the property de-
voted to the public use, no more, no less. It would seem that
the rules of law casting the duty upon the various state regula-
tory commissions to increase or decrease so-called rate contracts,
as the exigencies of the" time may demand, are founded upon
sound economic principles.
In conclusion it may be said that in consonance with the
advanced text and judicial authority, it is equally beneficial to
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the consumer and to the public service corporation that a state
regulatory commission have complete control over rates, how-
ever fixed, and that such control comes within the undoubted
police and sovereign powers of the state.
